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f you are out to describe the truth," Einstein once said, "leave elegance to the tailor."
Indeed, in the world of science, and biotechnology in particular, describing a concept in elegant and concise terms is the exception more than the rule. This is no less true in the world of intellectual property, and, again, in biotech patents in particular, where disclosures of inventions -known as the "written description" -can often occupy hundreds of pages.
Part of this trend toward the verbose is by design, as highlighted in Ariad Pharmaceuticals et al. v. Eli Lilly,
1 an important April 2009 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There, the exclusive court for appeals of patent cases held that Ariad's patent, while being rather lengthy, failed to provide sufficient information describing the claimed invention (a method for reducing activity of a gene transcription factor) to satisfy the written description requirement. The case highlights the importance of detailing invention descriptions as much as possible, especially in the biotech realm.
The story began when scientists from Ariad and its licensors, MIT, Harvard, and the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research, discovered a transcription factor, which they called NF-kB, which has been labeled "an all-purpose cellular paramedic." When dangerous elements (for example, bacteria) from outside the cell penetrate it, NF-kB becomes "activated" and stimulates the cell nucleus to manufacture proteins that combat the bacteria. These proteins, however, can be harmful if produced in great excess, much as a higher body temperature (i.e., a fever) fights infection but can be very dangerous if it persist for too long.
The Ariad patent claimed a method for artificially reducing NF-kB activity so as to minimize the side effects of protein overstimulation. Concretely, the invention would, for example, reduce fever in infected patients.
In 2002, on the day the patent on this method was granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office, Ariad and its licensors sued Eli Lilly and Company and asserted that the latter's Evista® and Xigris® pharmaceutical products infringed certain claims of the patent.
In response, Lilly argued that the patent was invalid, i.e., should never have been issued by the US Patent and Trademark Office in the first place, for three independent reasons. First, it was "anticipated"; that is, an earlier patent disclosed the same putatively "inventive" material claimed in Ariad's patent. Second, the material in the patent application detailing the invention and supporting the claims was inadequate. Third, the written description of the invention would not have allowed, or "enabled" in patent lingo, a person of ordinary skill in the field to make the claimed invention.
In general, the US patent system involves a trade-off between the inventor and the public: In exchange for about 20 years of exclusive rights, the inventor must share with the public the details of how the invention works. This reciprocity aims, as Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution says, to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
As earlier cases have found, the written description requirement "serves both to satisfy the inventor's obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of the invention that is claimed." 2 It fulfills "a teaching function, as a quid pro quo in which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period of time." 3 In this case, Lilly argued that Ariad's patent failed to describe in sufficient detail how NF-kB activity could be reduced. The parties agreed that the patent "hypothesized" three types of molecules capable of effecting such a reduction, but Lilly maintained that such speculation was inadequate to satisfy the written description requirement.
For its part, Ariad argued that because the claims did not cover any of these molecules as its invention, it was under no obligation to describe such molecules in detail. But the Federal Circuit rejected that argument, explaining that the central inquiry revolves around whether what was disclosed in the patent is adequate to satisfy the written description requirement.
The court elaborated that "what is adequate depends upon the context of the claimed invention," and in the field of biological subject matter, this context includes the existing knowledge in the field, the content of already existing technology, the maturity of the field, and the "predictability" of the particular invention seeking patent protection. 4 Significantly, both parties agreed that Ariad's 
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research took place in uncharted waters, requiring highly unpredictable exploration.
As it turned out, the court held that Ariad had not disclosed the DNA sequence of one of the three molecule types that inhibited NF-kB until two years after it had effectively filed its patent application, that Ariad hadn't pointed to any examples of the second type of molecule, and that while Ariad properly disclosed specific DNA sequences of the third molecule type, it failed to describe how that molecule actually reduced NF-kB activity.
Thus, as the Federal Circuit concluded, because the claims of the patent were so broad (they covered essentially all manner of curbing NF-kB activation), the claims required, but here lacked, commensurately broad and adequate support in the patent's written description.
One of the three judges on the panel, Judge Richard Linn, authored a separate opinion, concurring in his colleagues' ruling but disagreeing with their reasoning. Judge Linn stated, as he and other judges have previously contended, that there should be no separate "written description" requirement independent of the "enablement" requirement. In other words, a patent must simply provide a sufficient description of the invention so that a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field could practice the claimed invention. Judge Linn's approach, if adopted by the rest of the court, would likely mean a somewhat easier hurdle for patent owners to clear. But that view remains, for now, a minority one.
Lilly had also argued that the claims were invalid because they encompassed a natural phenomenon, which does not qualify as an "invention" under the patent statute. The Federal Circuit sidestepped this point, finding the patent invalid on written description grounds.
But a related issue may again come before the court, as in early May, a variety of plaintiffs, including breast cancer patients and the American Civil Liberties Union, filed suit against Myriad Pharmaceuticals, asserting that the company's patent on an assay used to test for the presence of the BRCA gene associated with breast cancer should never have been granted because genetic "discoveries" do not qualify as inventions. 5 Ultimately, the take-home message from the Ariad case is that the courts continue to enforce the written description requirement, and biotech companies in particular ignore these strictures at their peril. Especially when claiming a broad invention, biotech firms should take care to bolster their patents with as much detail as is reasonably possible. Thus, it seems Einstein had it right: Describing the truth may not be elegant, but when it comes to patents, it's indispensable. 
